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 When a multinational enterprise (MNE) undertakes foreign direct investment (FDI), it does so 
through a two stage process.  First, the MNE researches several possible locations and narrows its focus 
to a handful of potential sites.  Then these potential locations bid against one another by offering firm-
specific tax reductions and other incentives to the firm to ensure that they become the host.  This 
competition takes place between countries as well as between locations within a federation (such as 
between U.S. states).  As shown in Table 1, incentives offered by states are both large and common.  One 
example is the package Kentucky offered to the Toyota Motor Corporation in 1985.  The state offered 
free land, $47 million in new roads, and $65 million in employee training programs to ensure that it 
hosted the new plant (Jackson, 1987).  The use of such incentives has increased dramatically.  According 
to Chi (1989), by 1988 tax incentives for job creation were used by thirty-five states, a 30 percent increase 
from 1984.  Presently, all states offer some form of incentives (Site Selection, 2000). 
 This tax competition between locations within a federation is strongly criticized.  Since the firm 
has already announced its intention to invest in the country even without enticement, incentives are said 
to merely transfer rents to the firm.  Of particular concern is the possibility of a prisoner’s dilemma in 
which the host state may offer such large incentives that the net gain from FDI for the host and the nation 
is zero.  In this sense, the host may win the battle by securing the investment, but the country can lose the 
war since it gains nothing from doing so.  This idea was succinctly stated by a protest organizer who 
complained that Toyota had “played [then Kentucky governor] Martha Layne for a sucker... they’re 
taking our tax dollars to help cut their operating cost” (United Press International, 1986).  This concern is 
supported by the empirical evidence and simulation results of Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995), who find 
that the subsidies needed to win a firm may offset any gains the state receives.  A recent article in The 
Economist (2000) also suggests that tax competition prevents local governments from pursuing their 
constituents’ desired tax policies.  In response to such criticisms, a number of authors including Graham 
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and Krugman (1993) and Glickman and Woodward (1989) have recommended that tax competition 
between states be banned.  These arguments assume, however, that states would set nationally optimal tax 
rates in the absence of competition.  This paper shows that if there exist positive interstate spillovers from 
FDI, individually optimal state taxes will exceed the nationally optimal tax.  This distorts the firm’s 
production and location decisions relative to the national optimum.  Since competition lowers state taxes, 
allowing states to compete can enhance national welfare rather than reduce it. 
 When setting taxes, it is natural to expect states to consider the impact of policies on their own 
residents while ignoring the effects on other states’ residents.  Thus, if FDI creates interstate spillovers, a 
state’s optimal tax differs from the nation’s optimal tax.  In this paper, I analyze one such spillover:  the 
effect of taxation on the price of the MNE’s good. 1, 2  If a higher state tax reduces MNE output, this 
translates into higher prices for all states.  In effect, because the firm translates the increased taxes into 
higher prices, the host state can extract surplus for itself from across the country.  This motive is well-
known in the literature on optimal taxation of international trade in commodities (see Chapter 12 of 
Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan, 1998).  Since the taxing state ignores the impact of its tax on the 
consumers of other states, this leads it to set a tax which is too high relative to the national optimum.  
These same high taxes in one state, however, can drive the firm to another.  As a result, states compete for 
the firm by lowering their taxes, indicating that tax competition can help to alleviate the inefficiencies 
                                                          
 1 Other spillovers between states can certainly be envisioned.  A wealth of literature, summarized 
by Blomström and Kokko (1998), provides evidence for nationwide technological spillovers. DePater and 
Myers (1994) discuss a model in which taxation in one state affects returns on investment elsewhere.  
Another possible spillover is when the MNE employs workers who reside in non-host states.  Since these 
benefits accrue to non-host labor, again the host ignores their gains from FDI. 
 2 Because taxation affects other states through the MNE’s price, there is a link between my results 
and those for commodity tax competition including Gordon (1983), Mintz and Tulkens (1986), de 
Crombrugghe and Tulkens (1990), and Kanbur and Keen (1993).  These models feature jurisdictions that 
compete for mobile consumers by taxing a consumption good and predict similar tax competition effects 
as the WZM models.  A key difference between this work and mine is that whereas they have production 
of the good in each state and competition over mobile consumers, I have production in one state and 
competition over a mobile producer. 
 4
caused by decentralized decision-making.  Stated differently, when a state does not face competition for 
the ability to host the firm, it uses its monopoly power in the “hosting” market to capture rents for itself 
while creating inefficiencies in the market.  Therefore, just as with product markets, introducing 
competition into the “hosting” market can reduce such welfare losses.   
 Although this benefit from tax competition has yet to be recognized, other examples of beneficial 
tax competition exist.  In the Leviathan models of Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Edwards and Keen 
(1996), and Wilson (2000), some part of public funds are “wasted” by the self-serving politicians.  Since 
tax competition leads to lower taxes, waste is reduced and welfare rises.  Bond and Samuelson (1986) 
find that tax competition improves welfare when locations have private information about their costs.  
Jurisdictions can signal this information to the firm by offering tax holidays, leading the firm to choose 
the most efficient location.    Alternatively, Black and Hoyt (1989) model subsidy competition between 
states for a firm under perfect information.  They find that, since subsidies can induce labor migration and 
lower the average cost of providing a public good, tax competition results in welfare improvements. 
 Similarly, there is a large literature on how the taxation of mobile capital in one location can 
affect the welfare other locations (see Wilson, 1999, for an excellent survey).  In this literature, pioneered 
by Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) (WZM), locations tax mobile capital in order to 
provide a public good.  By lowering its own tax, a state can attract capital from elsewhere.  This creates a 
negative “fiscal externality” that reduces other states’ tax bases.  In equilibrium, there is a “race to the 
bottom” in taxes making all states are worse off due to underprovision of the public good.  My analysis 
differs from the WZM models in four key ways.  First, the standard treatment models the government’s 
policy instrument as a profit tax that applies to all firms or a tax on all mobile capital.  However, locales 
rarely alter their income taxes to attract a single firm.  Instead, as Table 1 shows, the tax breaks are 
generally firm-specific reductions in the taxes associated with the firm’s domestic inputs.  Even those 
U.S. states that do offer corporate income tax credits almost always link them to employment levels or 
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employee salaries. 3  Overall, Chi (1989) reports that the three most common incentives were tax 
exemptions for inventories, tax exemptions on raw materials used in manufacturing, and subsidies for job 
creation.  Second, rather than modeling the MNE’s location problem as a one in which the firm decides 
how to split its activities up across all of the jurisdictions, I consider one in which the MNE chooses a 
discrete, single location.  This is the framework used by Black and Hoyt (1989), King and Welling 
(1992), and King, McAfee, and Welling (1993).  Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2001) find that 
data from the OECD is consistent with governments competing for discrete firms.  Third, the MNE’s 
profits do not enter national welfare.  In the standard models, the MNE calls one of the federation’s 
members home.  This does not, however, mirror the primary criticism of tax subsidies for FDI since an 
inbound MNE can repatriate its profits to a location outside the federation.  As Glickman and Woodward 
(1989) show, the packages offered to foreign MNEs are comparable to those offered to mobile domestic 
firms.  For example, Tennessee offered General Motors more than $70 million in incentives for the plant 
established there in 1990.  This amounted to $23,333 per worker, a figure not out of line with those 
reported in Table 1.  Despite this, incentives offered to foreign MNEs receive far more criticism than 
incentives to domestic firms precisely because these incentives accrue to non-U.S. individuals. This is 
also precisely the concern of the Kentucky protestor, since it is the impact of the subsidies on the foreign 
firm’s “bottom line” that provoked such rancor.  It is also inherent to the critique of Spencer and Steckler 
(2002) who suggest promoting local firms over foreign firms because “they recirculate money in the 
community rather than exporting it to far-off locations” (pg. 4B).  Finally, my focus is not on public good 
provision.  Since the incentives in Table 1 are those offered to a single firm and do not affect the taxation 
of other firms by any of the states, the case can be made that the fiscal externality from this type of 
competition is minimal. Instead, I focus on how tax competition affects the output of the firm.  According 
to Head, Ries, and Swenson (1999) employment in Japanese MNEs increases by two to four employees 
for every worker paid for by a state, providing some evidence of a tax effect on employment of domestic 
                                                          
 3See Site Selection (2000, pp. 1003-1005) for detailed examples. 
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factors.  While I do discuss public goods in an extension, I feel that the lessons learned from the WZM 
models are well-known and therefore focus on what my analysis adds to the debate. 
 Recently, Haufler and Wooton (1999) have made steps towards this approach.  They examine 
profit tax competition between two nations when there exist barriers to trade.  They find that, given 
transport costs between the nations, both nations offer subsidies to a firm which locates in only one of the 
two countries.  In equilibrium, the firm locates in the larger country due to its larger domestic market.  
However, they do not consider the aggregate welfare of the two nations, nor do they allow for any 
production cost differences between the countries.  Survey evidence by Glickman and Woodward (1989) 
shows that labor costs are the dominant factor in location decisions by foreign MNE’s in the U.S., with 76 
percent of the firms agreeing or strongly agreeing that the cost of labor is an important factor in location 
decisions.  Tax incentives, however, are the least important factor, with only 43 percent of firms 
indicating that they are important in location decisions.  Since production cost differentials appear to 
dominate tax considerations, they will play a central role in my model of the MNE’s location decision. 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section lays out the structure of the 
model.  It also presents the solution to the firm’s problem and compares the locally and nationally optimal 
taxes.  The following two sections analyze the equilibria without and with state tax competition.  Section 
5 extends the model in several ways, including public goods, national minimum taxes, tax harmonization, 
mobile labor, and additional domestic factors.  Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The Model 
 Consider a country with I states.  Each state i has Li immobile consumers, each of whom is 
endowed with 1 unit of labor.  States are numbered such that L1 $L2$...$LI, i.e. state 1 is relatively most 
abundant in labor.  A more general interpretation of Li is as the state’s endowment of those immobile 
domestic factors used by the MNE including labor, land, and local intermediate inputs.  Consumers derive 
utility from the consumption of two goods, A and B, both of which are private goods.  While I can also 
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include a third, publicly-provided good, with unconstrained head taxes, this does not change the results at 
all and only adds notation.  Therefore, I set aside public goods for now and discuss them in Section 5.4.  
Preferences are homothetic and identical across all consumers.  This preference structure is chosen 
because it permits me to ignore the distribution of income for both state and national welfare, allowing me 
to focus on the benefits of tax competition. 4  Good A is produced in each state using a common 
technology g(Li), which has a positive but diminishing marginal productivity of labor.  This implies that 
with competitive factor markets, prior to any FDI, the state which is relatively abundant in the MNE’s 
domestic factor also has the lowest marginal opportunity cost for that factor.  Note that this is relative 
abundance, thus with additional factors used in production of A, the state with the most labor need not 
have the lowest wage.  I deal with this alternative in Section 5.3.   Good A is then sold competitively on 
the world market, where it has a constant price normalized to unity. 5  Good B is produced by a 
monopolistic MNE, which will locate in some state i, using labor hired in the state in which it locates, 
denoted li. 6  The production function for B is f(li) which exhibits non-increasing returns to scale.  
Additional factors imported by the MNE such as foreign capital and technology can be embedded into 
this production function.  These additional factors, however, do not affect the MNE’s marginal cost of 
labor in the host state and therefore have no bearing on the equilibrium.  Thus, for simplicity, I omit these 
additional factors. 7  Good B is sold according to the downward-sloping inverse demand p(f(li)).  For 
                                                          
 4 With non-homothetic preferences, the federal government may desire to use the lump sum 
transfers to affect income distributions across and within states.  Since this added complication does not 
alter the intuition for the benefits of tax competition I discuss, I omit it from the present analysis and 
instead make this expanded case available upon request. 
 5 Note that all other prices and incomes are normalized such that they are relative to the price of 
good A. 
 6 As summarized by Caves (1996), a necessary condition for a multinational firm is that it must 
maintain control over a proprietary asset, removing it from a perfectly competitive market.  To simplify 
the analysis, I momentarily assume away competition in the market for the MNE’s good and return to this 
issue in Section 5.5. 
 7 An expanded version of model including these factors is available upon request. 
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simplicity, I assume that demand in the country is met entirely by domestic production and that there are 
no exports by the MNE.  At the end of Section 5.5, I discuss the implications of introducing imports and 
additional B producers.  With no barriers to interstate trade, the price p is the national relative price of B. 
 The timing of the model is that the federal government chooses the labor tax rate it applies to the 
MNE, τ, and a set of lump-sum transfers to each of the states T = {T1, ..., TI}. 8  Following this, each state 
i chooses a firm-specific labor tax rate that is applied to the MNE if it locates in their state.  Since these 
taxes are only paid by the MNE, they are also the differential between the MNE’s tax and the tax rates for 
domestic producers (which are normalized to zero).  Under tax competition, states use their labor taxes to 
bid for the firm.  After these taxes are set, the MNE chooses where to locate and how much labor to hire.  
Since the solution technique is subgame perfection, I begin with the MNE and work backwards. 
2.1 The Multinational Firm 
 The MNE maximizes its global profits through its choice of location and labor.  Although the 
firm considers itself a monopolist in its final good, it takes the cost of labor as given.  Per unit labor costs 
in a particular state are the sum of the wage in state i (wi), the labor tax in state i (ti), and the federal labor 
tax (τ).  The firm’s profit if it locates in state i is then given by: 
 κτπ −++−= iiiiii ltwlflfp )()())((       (1) 
where κ is the fixed cost of setting up the MNE’s local affiliate.  This fixed cost is large enough so that it 
is only profitable to set up one plant.  Since the wage rate is determined competitively and the domestic 
producers’ taxes are normalized to zero, in equilibrium wi = gl(Li - li).  This yields the MNE’s equilibrium 
labor decision (suppressing the arguments of functions): 
 
( )p f p f g tf l l
i+ = + +τ
        (2) 
The comparative statics for the MNE’s labor choice is then: 
                                                          
 8One example of a federal tax incentive is the Job Training Partnership Act, which provides 
federal U.S. funds for job training. 
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Note that this implies that increases in either state or federal taxes lead to identical reductions in the 
MNE’s employment of domestic factors.  Finally, depending on the shape of p, due to the fixed cost there 
can exist a cost of labor large enough so that the firm does not produce at all. 
2.2 States 
 States choose taxes to maximize the welfare of their citizens.  Identical, homothetic preferences 
imply that indirect utility is a linear function of income and a declining function of prices.  Thus, I can 
write the welfare function for state i of Ui =γ(p)Yi, where Yi is the income in state i where γ(p) is 
















TltlLglLgY     (4) 
Note that the MNE’s profits are not included in state income.  This is done to reflect the oft-voiced 
concern that tax subsidies and profits are simply repatriated to the MNE’s home country and do not 
benefit the host.  If some portion of MNE profits appear in the host state’s income, then similar benefits 
from tax competition are found, although naturally the details change. 10  Using (4), state i’s welfare is:   
U
p f k l g L l g L l t l T
p f k l g L T
i
i i i i
l
i i i i i
j j i i=







( ( ( , )) ( ( ) ( ( ) ) )
( ( ( , )) ( ( ) )
if i hosts the MNE
otherwise.    (5) 
                                                          
 9I could allow additional sources of state income without affecting the tax competition 
equilibrium.  However, since these add nothing except for notation, I ignore them. 
 10 In this case, state and federal incentives to tax the MNE are smaller because higher taxes mean 
lower profits.  Nevertheless, unless all of the profits enter Yi, the host state will still tax in a manner 
similar to that presented.  Additionally, even if profits fully enter Yi, the host state will still not use its tax 
to induce the efficient output of good B since it prefers to extract income from other states through 
monopoly pricing.  The federal government, however, would use its tax for this purpose.  Thus, since in 
the absence of federal intervention host taxes are too high, tax competition provides similar benefits to the 
presented case. 
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If the firm locates in state i, for a given federal tax and transfer, the state’s optimal tax rate, ti*(τ,Ti), is 
such that: 
 ( )( ) .0* =+−+ iiiillilfip ldtdllgtfpY γγγ       (6) 
It is important to recognize that ti*(τ,Ti) may be positive or negative.  A large price effect (the first term in 
equation (6)) or a highly elastic wage rate leads the state to subsidize the MNE’s production, thus, 
depending on the parameterization of the model, the state may lower the MNE’s price of labor below the 
market price.  To simplify the following presentation, I discuss the case where ti*(τ,Ti) $0 for all i, 
however this is purely for exposition and does not affect my results.  Note that since welfare depends on 
the price, if a state does not host the MNE, its welfare is strictly decreasing in the host tax.  This is the 
source of the negative spillovers from state taxation.  If, however, output is unaffected by the tax rate, no 
spillovers exist.  The employment effects estimated by Head, Ries, and Swenson (1999) provide some 
evidence that the derived tax effect on output mirrors that in practice.   
2.3 Federal Government 
 The federal government chooses its tax rate and lump-sum transfers to maximize national 
welfare.  Given the preference structure, the federal government’s objective function when the firm 







 is national income.  The federal government is 













iijiiN ltlLglLgLglfpU τγ    (7) 
Under identical, homothetic preferences the distribution of income across states is irrelevant for national 
welfare excepting how it affects states’ taxes.  Given that the MNE locates in state i, the nationally 
optimal total tax burden, tiN, is the one that sets 
 ( )( ) .0=+−+ iiilliNlfNp lddllgtfpY γτγγ       (8) 
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As with a state’s optimal tax, the nationally optimal tax burden may be negative.  Also, since the federal 
government is indifferent between combinations of the state and federal tax, it is only concerned with the 
total tax burden.  Thus, the government chooses its tax rate such that τ + ti(τ,Ti) is as close to tiN as 
possible.  Note that the federal tax affects non-host states by influencing the equilibrium price. 
 It is important to recognize the different implications of a labor tax and a profit tax for national 
welfare.  A pure profit tax does not affect the firm’s first order condition and would therefore not affect 
the firm’s hiring or output decisions in a given state.  The same holds for the lump sum taxes of Black and 
Hoyt (1989) and King, McAfee, and Welling (1993).  A labor tax, however, can affect these choices even 
if it does not affect the firm’s location.  This distinction between the effects of a profit tax and a labor tax 
is critical in determining the implications of tax competition.  A reduction in labor taxes is associated with 
an increase in hiring and output, both of which can be beneficial to the host and the nation.  A reduction 
in a profit tax, however, simply transfers more rents to the firm and reduces national welfare.  This 
distinction highlights the importance of appropriately modeling the policy instruments used to attract 
investment since the criticisms of tax competition may be on target for profit taxes but not for other tax 
instruments. 
 With the model laid out, I now derive the equilibria both without and with state tax competition. 
 
3.  No State Tax Competition 
 In order to judge the welfare implications of tax competition, it is necessary to examine a baseline 
case.  Since both Graham and Krugman (1993) and Glickman and Woodward (1989) suggest banning tax 
competition, I first consider a situation without competition, that is, in which states assume that they will 
host the firm with some exogenous probability.  Compare this to the competition case below in which this 
probability is a function of all the state tax rates, giving rise to strategic tax setting.  Two alternative 
baseline cases are a minimum permissible tax imposed by the federal government and tax harmonization 
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in which all states must set the same tax rate.  These alternatives are straightforward once the main results 
have been derived.  Therefore, I defer them to Section 5.1.   
 Recall that the tax rates are firm specific.  As such, a state’s tax rate only has welfare effects if it 
actually hosts the firm.  Therefore, each state simply chooses its optimal tax as given by (6).  Since each 
state’s tax is independent of its perceived probability of winning, I can consider any set of exogenous 
perceived probabilities, including those that do not sum to one.  In this section, I analyze the firm’s 
location decision and the welfare aspects of state taxation without tax competition.    
 
Lemma 1: When the federal tax rate and all transfers are zero, the tax rate in any winning state is greater 
than the nationally optimal state tax. 
 
Proof: The tax set by the winning state i, is ti*(0,0).  Plugging the result from equation (6) into the federal 
government’s first order condition yields:  
 














       (9) 
Thus without federal intervention, state i’s optimal tax rate is greater than the nationally optimal tax 
burden when the firm locates in state i.         
 When a single state chooses its tax, it ignores the impact this has on the other states.  Since the tax 
burden is borne by the consumers in all states, without federal intervention the host taxes its labor too 
heavily from the national perspective.  Some federations, such as the European Union, lack an 
overarching federal tax authority with the power to correct this problem.  In other federations, such as the 
United States, the federal government can take an active role and affect the host state’s tax rate. Since the 
federal government acts as a Stackelberg leader, it chooses τ such that the total tax burden τ + ti*(τ,Ti) is as 
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close to tiN as possible.  If the federal government is unconstrained in its tax, it will always be able to 
choose a tax rate such that the nationally optimal tax burden is obtained. 11 
 
Lemma 2: When the MNE locates in state i without tax competition, for a given set of lump sum transfers 









τ comp no * . 
 
Proof: This follows from combining equations (6) and (8), such that τi* no comp = tiN - ti*(τi* no comp,Ti).       




ji TT , 
and τi* no comp=0.  This transfers all income to state i, leading it to choose the nationally optimal tax rate 
without any need for a federal tax rate.  In practice, such a solution would clearly be difficult to 
implement.  Therefore, for the remainder of the paper, I assume that the states’ shares of federal tax 
revenues are constrained, as would occur if the federal government made equal transfers to each 
consumer. 12  This leaves the federal government with only its tax rate τ to influence state taxes.  As long 
as the non-host states enjoy positive income, Lemma 2 implies that the federal government needs to 
subsidize the host state’s labor if it is to reach the national optimum.  Since this amounts to forcing non-
host states to subsidize the host’s labor, this too may be politically difficult to implement. If the federal 
government is constrained to a non-negative tax rate and the non-winning states have a positive total 
income, the national optimum is unattainable.  Figure 1 illustrates the results of these two lemmas. 
                                                          
 11 This is comparable to Walz and Wellisch (1996) who consider competition in expenditures for 
a mobile, oligopolistic firm.  They too find that although competition may be inefficient, its problems can 
be corrected by allowing the federal government to intervene using the same tool available to the states.  
 12 Recall that under identical, homothetic preferences, the distribution of income across states is 
irrelevant for national welfare. 
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 This says nothing about which state hosts the MNE without competition, which is in general 
impossible to determine.  State 1 is relatively abundant in labor, and thus has the lowest pre-tax cost of 
labor.  This large population also gives it an incentive to keep prices (and taxes) low, however, if the 
elasticity of wages is small, it may set a tax rate high enough that the firm may prefer to locate elsewhere.  
A similar ambiguity under tax competition is found in Hwang and Choe (1995).  For them, however, it is 
the income effect on public good provision that leads to this ambiguity rather than movements in wages.  
Despite these limitations on determining who hosts the MNE without competition, I can determine the 
nationally optimal firm location. 
 
Lemma 3: At the nationally optimal tax burden, national welfare is highest when the firm locates in the 
state which is most abundant in the MNE’s domestic factor. 
 
Proof: Suppose that the firm is located in some state j … 1 where the total tax burden is tj.  There exists a 
tax burden t1 such that the cost of labor is the same in states 1 and j, making the firm indifferent between 
these two locations.  This yields the same labor demand l and the same price p in both states.  Comparing 
national welfare when the firm locates in state 1 with national welfare when it locates in state j yields: 
 U U p g L g L l g L g L l
N jN j j1 1 1− = − − − − −γ ( )[ ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))].     (10) 
By the concavity of g, U1N - UjN $ 0, with a strict inequality if and only if L1>Lj.  Thus, keeping output the 
same but shifting production from a high-cost to the low-cost state improves national welfare.  Finally, 
since by definition national welfare is higher at t1N than at this cost-equivalent t1, moving to the nationally 
optimal tax rate when the firm locates in state 1 provides an additional improvement in national welfare. 
             
 Locating the firm in the lowest-wage state is nationally optimal because the low-cost state also 
presents the greatest opportunity for the firm to generate surplus, a portion of which can be extracted by 
 15
the nation through the labor taxes.  As shown in Section 5.3, with additional domestic factors of 
production, this optimal location will not always be the “largest” or most populous state.  Nevertheless, 
the nationally optimal location is still the one that generates the greatest surplus from investment and thus 
the greatest opportunity to collect tax revenues.  Combining Lemma 3 with the ambiguity over firm 
location without competition indicates that even if the federal government is unconstrained in its taxation, 
the non-competitive setting may be sub-optimal since the firm may locate in a high-cost state.  Under 
competition, both of these concerns evaporate. 
 
4.  State Tax Competition 
 States compete in their tax packages by lowering their taxes just enough so that the firm prefers to 
locate in their state rather than any other, i.e. states engage in Bertrand competition in their labor markets.  
This is equivalent to endogenizing the perceived probability of state i winning the firm such that this 
probability is zero if there exists a lower cost location and is one if state i is the lowest cost location.  An 
alternative way of looking at the competition is a second price auction, that is the state that bids the most 
(i.e. offers the lowest labor cost) wins the firm but only must pay the second highest bid (i.e. can set its 
labor cost equal to the second-cheapest state).  Unlike competition in profit taxes or lump-sum subsidies, 
competition in taxes on domestic inputs affects the firm’s output as well as its equilibrium location.  The 
equilibrium of this bidding war is stated in my first proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: The state which is most abundant in the MNE’s domestic factor will host the MNE in the 
tax competition equilibrium. 
 
Proof: Consider two states i and j where Li $ Lj.  By the nature of Bertrand competition, this implies that 
the cost of labor in each state will be equal: 
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j j+ − + = + − +( ) ( )τ τ .       (11) 
With equal costs, an equal amount of labor is hired in either location.  Thus, li = lj = l.  Furthermore, p is 
the same.  This implies that the value a state gets from hosting the firm is entirely due to the change in its 
income, not the price.  As is well known in the theory on second price auctions, to find the winner of the 
auction, one must find the bidder who gains the greatest value from the object.  In this context, this is the 
state whose income rises the most when it hosts the firm and the MNE hires l workers.  For state i, this is 
given by )())(()( iiil
i LgltlLglLg −+−+−  with an analogous difference for j.  By the concavity of g: 
 )()()()( lLglLgLgLg jiji −−−≤−        (12) 




i LgltlLglLgLgltlLglLg −+−+−≥−+−+− ,   (13) 
that is, the relatively large state i will win the firm.  By induction, state 1, the state with the greatest 
supply of the MNE’s domestic input, will always win the MNE under tax competition.  Since state 2 








lLgLgt l        (14) 






lLgLgTt l ττ ≤−−
−−
=      (15) 
which, since l depends on the federal tax τ, varies with the federal tax.  If, when t2 is given by (14) state 1 
must lower its tax to win the firm, then (15) holds with strict inequality.     
 This equilibrium is exactly that derived by Black and Hoyt (1989) and King, McAfee, and 
Welling (1993) in which the state that generates the largest surplus from investment wins the investment.  
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Here, the state with the largest endowment of the MNE’s domestic factor generates the largest increase in 
surplus when the firm hires its labor because it has the relatively lowest marginal productivity of labor in 
the A sector.  Since this state gains the most from the firm, it is willing to offer the most generous 
incentives, translating into an equilibrium in which the low-cost state undercuts its high-cost competitors.  
Therefore, regardless of the tax policy chosen by the federal government, the same state hosts the MNE 
under tax competition.  Since this is the state that generates the greatest surplus from the MNE, it is no 
surprise that this is also the nationally optimal location as discussed in Lemma 3.  Although the firm is 
indifferent between locating in states 1 and 2 in this equilibrium, it is not unreasonable to expect it to 
locate in the nation’s preferred state.  As Glickman and Woodward (1989) point out, foreign firms in the 
U.S. go to great lengths to secure goodwill, so I assume that if the firm is indifferent between locations, it 
locates in the nation’s preferred state.  Thus, similar to Bond and Samuelson (1986) but for very different 
reasons, tax competition results in the efficient firm location.  Furthermore, if any other state would desire 
to bid away the firm (i.e. true tax competition exists), then state 1 must curb its taxation in order to host 
the MNE.  The implications of these changes on national welfare are summarized in my final two 
propositions. 
 
Proposition 2: If non-negative federal taxes are permitted, national welfare cannot be lower under tax 
competition than in its absence. 
 
Proof: When the firm locates in state 1, the nationally optimal tax burden is t1N from equation (8).  Since  
t1(τ,T1) # t1(τ,T1) for all τ, this leads the federal government to choose  
 τ1*comp = t1N - t1(τ1* comp,T1) $τ* no comp = t1N - t1(τ1* no comp,T1).      (16) 
As shown in Figure 1, depending on the shape of t1(τ,T1), τ1*comp may be positive.  Therefore, national 
welfare is at least as large under competition as it is when state 1 hosts the MNE without competition.  
Furthermore, by Lemma 3, welfare is at least as large at the nationally optimal tax rate when state 1 hosts 
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the MNE as when any other state hosts the MNE.  Therefore national welfare cannot fall under tax 
competition.            
Thus, the nation cannot be made worse off by tax competition.  My final proposition states sufficient 
conditions for competition to improve national welfare. 
 
Proposition 3: If any state with L < L1 hosts the MNE without competition, national welfare rises under 
tax competition.  Also, if τ is restricted to non-negative values and t1(τ,T1) < t1(τ,T1) for all T1 and τ for 
which the MNE produces, then national welfare rises under tax competition.  Further, if t1(0,T1) # t1N then 
the nationally optimum can be obtained. 
 
Proof: If any state other than the lowest-cost one hosts the MNE without competition, tax competition 
ensures that the firm will locate in the most beneficial place.  Following Lemma 3, this improves national 
welfare.   
 Now consider cases where the federal government can only set non-negative federal taxes.  As 
discussed above, this indicates that the national optimum is unattainable without competition.  When 
t1(τ,T1) < t1(τ,T1) for all T1 and τ that support positive production, as shown in Figure 1, then the national 
government will always be able to choose some τ $ 0 that brings the total tax burden τ + t1(τ,T1) closer to 
t1N than was obtainable without tax competition.  Finally, if t1(0,T1) # t1N, then there will always exist a  
τ** = t1N  - t1(τ**,T1) > 0 which yields the nationally optimal tax burden.  Again, if a state with a labor 
endowment less than that in state 1 host the MNE without competition, then competition provides a 
second boost to national welfare since the firm will locate in state 1 under competition.      
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 Note that these are sufficient, not necessary conditions.  Thus, even in those situations in which 
the stringent conditions on t1(τ,T1) do not hold, depending on the functional forms and endowments, 
welfare improvements or even the national optimum can be found through tax competition.  This is 
because tax competition reduces the harmful rent-seeking associated with being a monopolist in the 
“hosting” market.  It is important to recognize the role of the federal tax rate in achieving the optimum.  If 
the federal tax rate is constrained to zero, forbidding tax competition is inefficient as shown in Lemma 1.  
Under tax competition, state 1 will set a lower tax than it would without competition, however, depending 
on the parameters chosen, the equilibrium state tax may be too low from the national perspective.  If  
t1(0,T1) > t1(0,T1) $ t1N, then tax competition still improves national welfare when state 1 hosts the FDI 
without competition.  If not, then tax competition may reduce national welfare.  Additionally, while 
Lemma 3 holds only for nationally optimal taxes, there is still a potential gain from ensuring the firm 
locates in the low-cost state. Finally, this result does not imply that state 1 prefers competition to 
unconstrained taxation.  For a given transfer from the federal government, state 1 would prefer to 
eliminate competition if it hosts the MNE without competition.  Thus, it is still possible that the host 
state’s welfare falls from competition as its host rents are bid away, however since the host gains at the 
expense of the other states, the nation overall can benefit. 
 
5.  Extensions 
In this section I discuss the implications of several alternative assumptions for my results. 
5.1 Minimum Taxes and Tax Harmonization 
 Here, I consider two alternative baselines besides that in which states assume that they win the 
firm with an exogenous probability.  First, suppose there is a federally imposed minimum tax such that no 
state can set its tax rate below this level.  This puts a lower bound on the equilibrium tax of the winning 
state.  If this constraint is non-binding, then this offers no advantages over unrestricted competition.  In 
particular, if the equilibrium state tax under competition is greater than t1N, a federal subsidy will still be 
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necessary to achieve the national optimum.  If the constraint is binding, this merely reduces the necessary 
corrective federal tax.  Note that if the minimum is set higher than t1N, this will necessitate a federal 
subsidy. 
 Alternatively, consider tax harmonization in which all states choose identical tax rates.  Here, the 
low-cost state will host the FDI since pre-tax costs will have the same ordering as post-tax costs.  If the 
states are constrained to choose t1N, then the nationally optimal tax rate is obtainable without federal 
intervention.  However, if federal taxes are unconstrained then harmonization offers no additional 
benefits.  Thus, even with alternative baseline cases, tax competition need not harm the federation. 
5.2 Mobile Labor 
 Although labor is generally immobile in models of tax competition, it is interesting to consider 
how allowing workers to migrate between states impacts my results.  Prior to FDI, all states are identical, 
each having the same number of workers all of whom receive the same wage.  When the firm enters, this 
increases the wage in the host state.  Because of this, workers from non-host states are attracted to the host 
until the marginal productivity of labor is equalized across states.  This implies that the number of 
workers in the non-host states (Llose) equals the number of workers in the host less the MNE’s hiring  
(Lwin-l).  Under this equilibrium symmetry, the equilibrium in tax competition must be such that the host is 
indifferent between winning the firm and losing.  Thus, if state i hosts: 
 g L T g L l g L l t l T
lose i win
l
win win i( ) ( ) ( ( ) )+ = − + − + +      (17) 
which implies that the equilibrium state tax is )( lLgt winl
win −−= , i.e. the host gains nothing by winning 
the firm.  This also implies that the only labor cost to the firm is the federal tax τ.  Therefore, in 
equilibrium, the federal government will simply set τ equal to the sum of the nationally optimal tax and 




5.3 Additional Domestic Factors 
 One shortcoming of the above model is that it predicts that the most populous state has the lowest 
wage before investment and will therefore be most successful at attracting foreign firms.  The most 
obvious reason for why even populous states have high wages is the existence of additional factors of 
production such as land or domestic capital.  Therefore, consider a variant in which good A is produced in 
each state using both labor (Li) and domestic capital (Ki) according to a constant returns to scale 
production function g(Ki,Li).  As before, in equilibrium, the state who gains the most from a given level of 
hiring by the MNE will win the firm.  Also, taxes will be such that this state sets its costs equal to the cost 
in the second best state whose tax is derived just as it was in equation (14).  Thus, the only issue is 
ranking the surplus generated by the MNE in the various states.  If both domestic capital and labor are 
used by the MNE, calculation of this depends in a complex on factor intensities of the two industries A 
and B, relative factor endowments, and the discrete marginal products of capital and labor.  If only labor is 
hired by the MNE, there exist two situations in which it is straightforward to pin down which state will 
win.  First, if all states have identical capital stocks, then the state with the lowest capital-labor ratio will 
host the state.  This is because it is possible to redefine the labor supply in each state as the effective labor 
supply, which is a simple reinterpretation of the above model.  Second, if all states have identical capital 
labor ratios, then the state with the largest supply of labor and capital will be the host.  This is because, for 
a given amount of labor hired by the MNE, output falls less in that state than in any other.  In any case, 
the nationally optimal location still hosts the firm under tax competition and tax competition has the same 
welfare implications as above. 
5.4 Public Goods 
 In many models of tax competition, public good provision is a central focus of the analysis.   
Typically they find that tax competition is inefficient because the revenue generated from mobile capital 
is required to provide a public good.  As locations compete for continuous levels of investment, taxes are 
driven down and the public good is underprovided in equilibrium.  Since in my model a single location 
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hosts the firm, this makes the standard modeling of public good provision somewhat awkward.  One way 
around this is to allow states to tax their immobile domestic factors.  If this taxation is unconstrained, it is 
well known that there will be no distortion between public and private good consumption in equilibrium.  
Therefore, if unrestricted taxation of immobile factors is possible, a model with public goods would 
reduce to the simple model presented above.   
If the taxation of domestic factors is constrained, without federal intervention the public good will 
by definition be underprovided in the non-host states.  Without competition, the host state may suffer 
underprovision as it seeks to manipulate the firm’s hiring decisions.  This potential underprovision will be 
exacerbated by tax competition just as in the standard tax competition models.  Since the federal tax does 
not have the location shifting effect state taxes do, the federal government can mitigate both the price 
externality and the public good provision problem by taxing the firm and transferring money to the states 
through the lump sum transfers.  If, however, the federal authority does not exist or it is constrained in its 
taxation, then it will not be able to reach the constrained Pareto frontier.  Nevertheless, tax competition 
will still benefit non-host states because of the lower prices brought about by competition for the firm.  In 
addition, tax competition removes some of the downward pressure on the location-neutral federal tax.  
Thus, in this case it is no surprise that tax competition has both the positive price effect and the traditional 
negative underprovision effect, yielding a net ambiguous impact on national welfare.  This ambiguity is 
similar Rauscher’s (1995) or Markusen, Morey, and Olewiler’s (1995) results, where pollution is the 
negative effect, and Edwards and Keen (1996), where reduced waste is the positive effect.  In any case, 
since the tax policies I examine are temporary and are only offered to a single firm, one can question the 
significance of any lasting impact they have on the winning state’s government budget.  Thus, despite the 
size of the incentives in Table 1, it is possible to question how important the public good provision 




5.5 Additional Extensions 
 Finally, I wish to consider three minor variants of the model.  First, as in Haufler and Wooton 
(1999), transport costs between states could be included.  If this cost is the same regardless of the 
destination, this simply increases the likelihood that the firm will locate in the low-cost state without 
competition since, by virtue of its wealthier market, it now offers an additional cost savings to the firm.  
This does not affect any of the other results, since state 1 is still the nationally optimal location and, 
similar to Haufler and Wooton, state 1 will have the greatest desire to host the firm and eliminate transport 
costs.  Second, if transfers are fixed and the federal government chooses its tax at the same time states do, 
the equilibria with and without competition are the same.  Since the federal government is indifferent 
between federally and locally collected taxes, its Nash best response is to set the federal tax equal to the 
difference between the host’s tax rate and the nationally optimal tiN.  Because this is the same optimal 
federal tax as in the Stackelberg framework, the same equilibria and welfare implications arise.  Finally, 
similar to Walz and Wellisch (1996), I could relax the assumption of a monopolist MNE.  Instead, 
suppose that the demand for the good B is met by Cournot competition between the MNE, imports from 
foreign firms, and immobile domestic firms.  In this case, the host state’s labor tax will affect the MNE’s 
output as well as domestic output and imports.  Since each state ignores the impact of its tax on other 
states’ consumers and firms, in the absence of tax competition, the host state will seek to exploit its 
market power in the non-competitive “hosting” market, implying that state taxes will again generally 
differ from the national optimum.  Once again, an unrestricted federal government could correct this 
problem.  If, however, a sub-optimal location hosts the firm without competition or the federal tax is 
constrained, then there are still potential advantages to permitting tax competition. 
  
6. Conclusion 
 This paper has shown that when FDI benefits states other than its host, this leads to excessive 
state taxation that can require federal subsidies to correct.  Tax competition places additional downward 
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pressure on state taxation, which can make it easier for the federal government to reach a nationally 
optimal tax burden.  Competition also ensures that the firm locates in the most beneficial location.  This 
indicates heretofore unexplored benefits from tax competition.  Thus recent criticisms that allowing states 
to compete against one another for mobile foreign investment can only hurt the nation need not be true.  
In fact, under plausible situations, state tax competition can be welfare improving for the country overall 
even though the winning state may prefer to eliminate competition. 
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1999 $300 500 payroll tax credits, low-cost space $50 $100,000 
Toyota2 
(Indiana) 
1998 $1200 2300 - $100 $43,000 
Fujitsu3 
(Oregon) 
1997 $1300 445 - $23 $52,000 
Mercedes4 
(Alabama) 













1988 $800 3000 Job training; land purchase assistance; site preparation; skills center; highway 




1988 $650 2900 Job training; road, water, sewage installation and improvements; land purchase 




1988 $500 1700 Job training; road, highway, sewer improvements; land acquisition assistance; $1 









1983 $850 3300 Job training; road, sewer, water, rail improvements; local property tax abatements; 




1982 $870 4200 Property tax abatement on buildings; previous $16.4 million grant to Honda for 




1978 $236 2500 Job training; Low-interest loans; rail and highway improvements; local tax 
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